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This study is aimed at providing evidence in regard with (1) the economic consequences
of quality of extended disclosure and (2) the influence of ownership and director char-
acteristics on the quality of extended disclosure. Using 260 firm years of the Indonesian
firms, this study finds that the increase of disclosure quality is found to have a positive
correlation with the increase of share price five (5) days after the announcement date
of financial reports and the increase of Return of Assets (ROA). In regard with ownership
and director characteristics, this study finds that government ownership and size of board
have a positive relationship with disclosure quality; while management and block-holder
ownership are not relevant in increasing disclosure quality. It is also found that individual
characteristics of director which are independence and financial expertise/background
do not have any relationship with the quality of extended disclosure. From the study, it
can be concluded that extended disclosure is an effective tool to increase the financial
performances of a firm under a concentrated ownership environment such as in Indone-
sia. Government and board directors are two players who induce firms to increase trans-
parency through voluntarily disclosure.
Keywords: voluntarily disclosure, concentrated ownership, corporate governance, independent director, economic
consequences
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memberikan bukti sehubungan dengan (1) konsekuensi
ekonomi dari kualitas pengungkapan diperpanjang dan (2) pengaruh kepemilikan dan
karakteristik direktur pada kualitas pengungkapan diperpanjang. Dengan menggunakan
260 perusahaan di Indonesia, studi ini menemukan bahwa peningkatan kualitas pen-
gungkapan ditemukan memiliki korelasi positif dengan kenaikan harga saham lima (5)
hari setelah tanggal pengumuman laporan keuangan dan peningkatan Return of Asset
(ROA). Berkenaan dengan kepemilikan dan karakteristik direktur, penelitian ini men-
emukan bahwa kepemilikan pemerintah dan ukuran dewan memiliki hubungan posi-
tif dengan kualitas pengungkapan; sementara manajemen dan kepemilikan pemegang
blok tidak relevan dalam meningkatkan kualitas pengungkapan. Juga ditemukan bahwa
karakteristik individu direktur yang independen dan keahlian / latar belakang keuangan
tidak memiliki hubungan dengan kualitas pengungkapan yang diperluas. Dari peneli-
tian ini, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pengungkapan yang diperluas adalah alat yang efek-
tif untuk meningkatkan kinerja keuangan perusahaan di bawah lingkungan kepemilikan
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yang terkonsentrasi seperti di Indonesia. Pemerintah dan dewan direksi adalah dua
pemain yang mendorong perusahaan untuk meningkatkan transparansi melalui pen-
gungkapan sukarela.
Keywords: voluntarily disclosure, concentrated ownership, corporate governance, independent director, economic
consequences
INTRODUCTION
The Asian Development Bank (2014) has reported that despite significant improvements made
by the Indonesian firms with regards to the implementation of good corporate governance, a
lack of disclosure qualities especially the disclosure of ownership structure and minority share-
holder protection is still the main weaknesses of corporate governance practices in Indonesia.
The phenomenon of low level of disclosure in Indonesia contradicts with theoretical benefits of
full disclosure. The literature of corporate governance asserts that low quality of disclosure will
result in asymmetric information which consequently decreases the confidence of investors. On
the other hand, it is argued that extended disclosures or voluntary disclosures provide investors
with ample information in correcting any misevaluation and increases investor’s interest and
stock liquidity (Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999). Hence, high quality of disclosure will result in
improved firm value, as investors are confident and able to predict firm’s financial performance.
Wang et al (2008) found a significant positive relation between voluntary disclosure and firm’s
financial performance measured by return on equity. Although theoretically extended disclo-
sure benefits firms, firms in Indonesia still are not encouraged to improve the disclosure through
extended or voluntary disclosures.
The less-dispersed ownership which may lead to the occurrence of information asymme-
try, is considered as a prevalent practice in many developing countries and identified as lower-
ing the quality of disclosure, as dominant shareholders might have more access to information
(Bauwhede andWillekens 2008). Ownership concentrationmay substitute other control mech-
anisms and can be used by block-holders to facilitate expropriation (Bozec and Bozec, 2007).
Attig et al (2006) suggest that inadequate disclosure will aggravate information asymmetry,
enabling block-holders to rely on insider information in making decisions which may benefit
block-holders but could harm the interest of non-block holders (minority shareholders). The-
oretically block-holders can affect firm value negatively through “voice” and “exit” (Edmans,
2014). As the block-holders have a big shares, they have more power (“voice”) to intervene
the management which may result in dispute or even they may dispel managers which conse-
quently harm the share prices. Furthermore, if the dispute is unsolved the block-holders may
“exit” from the companies by selling their shares which then pushing down the stock prices. On
the contrary, a diffused ownership company may have more incentives to provide voluntarily
disclosure in order to reduce agency costs, as voluntarily disclosure facilitates public commu-
nication which results in lower information asymmetry and adverse reaction from investors
(Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta 2010).
For the last few decades, there is an increasingly research interests on how the firm’s own-
ership structure affects information disclosure. Some studies provide evidence on the posi-
tive association between information disclosure and shares that held by institutional investors
(Ajinkya et al, 2005; Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005; Darmadi and Sodikin, 2013). However,
Leung and Horwitz (2004) found that board ownership negatively influences of voluntary dis-
closure.
In the Indonesian case, theWorld Bank (2010) has recommended some important improve-
ments in the agenda of corporate governance practices in Indonesia which mainly focus on
improving regulations regarding the disclosure and the effectiveness of independent commis-
sioners in order to improve corporate governance practises. Indonesia is the largest economy
in Southeast Asia and top eighteenth in the world and Indonesia is one of Asia’s emerging
capital markets which attracts global investment around the world. Compared with the other
East Asian countries, Indonesian listed firms has a higher level of ownership concentration and
the disclosure quality is still weak (Claessens et al., 2000). However, the benefits and determi-
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nants of extended disclosure, as well as the relationship between ownership characteristics and
disclosure quality in developing countries especially in Indonesia are still rarely observedcon-
sequences and determinants of extended disclosure in the concentrated ownership structure
countries especially Indonesia.
This paper examines the economic benefits of voluntarily disclosure and the determinants
of voluntarily disclosure in Indonesia which is characterized as highly concentrated ownership
environment.The economic benefit factors which are ROA and stock return were tested to cor-
relate with voluntarily disclosure. Factors influencing the quality of disclosure which include
ownership and director characteristics were also examined, as director characteristics are the
important parts of corporate governance mechanisms.
This research attempts to address gaps in the current literature as: (1) studies about determi-
nant and economic consequences of voluntarily disclosure are mostly conducted in developed
countries which have different capital markets and ownership environments; (2) the knowledge
about the reasons of low disclosure is still limited as many institutions such as the World Bank
and the AsianDevelopment Bank (ADB) reported that a lack of disclosure is themain weakness
of corporate governance in Indonesia and other emerging countries, a better understanding of
the determinants of extended disclosure is useful for regulators to improve the disclosure reg-
ulation; (3) knowledge of economic consequences is also still needed to explore. The economic
consequences awareness among the business players may increase the willingness of firms to
improve the quality of disclosure; (4) the paper involves two important variables, namely own-
ership variables and corporate governance variables argued as themost important determinants
of voluntarily disclosure in emerging countries which to some extent are overlooked.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
Transparency through disclosure is regarded as one of the most important aspects of good cor-
porate governance. Strong corporate governance could boostmore transparent information dis-
closure (Chen and Jaggi, 2000). Corporate governance play important role in ensuring firms
to comply with regulation and fairly uncover information to stakeholders. Based on agency
theory, firm management tend to not disclose information which may minimize market’s abil-
ity in monitoring firm performance which then creating “disclosure agency problem” (Kara-
manou andVafeas, 2005).The aim of firm’s information disclosure is to communicate economic
information about the firm to stakeholders that can be useful to make decisions on the alloca-
tion scarce resources (Cooke, 1989). Disclosure is expected to reduce asymmetry information
between owners and managers. Disclosure might enable shareholders to monitor managerial
performances andminority shareholders to control block-holders (Chau andGrey 2010).Hence
as explained before, disclosure is an important mechanisms to improve corporate governance
quality and it may benefit firms.
Capital market theory states that although there is no regulation which demands firms
to disclose information, firms may still prefer to disclose information to lever market value
(Clarkson et all 1994). This contention is based on the argument that managers try to convey
good news by disclosing more information. Firms may disclose information through finan-
cial reports as demanded by regulations. Furthermore, firms may engage in voluntarily disclo-
sure such as management forecasts, analyst presentations, and other corporate reports. There
are six hypotheses which explain why managers engage in voluntarily disclosure (Healy and
Palepu2001): First, capital market transaction hypothesis which argues that firms will try to
reduce asymmetry information risks which result in high cost of capital by increasing disclo-
sure. Second, corporate contest hypothesis asmanagers areworried to lose their jobs due to poor
stock performance, they tend to disclose information to convey good news through voluntarily
disclosure.Third, stock compensation hypothesis, as managers are rewarded using stock bonus,
they will try to reduce allegation risks of insider trading by disclosing more information to cap-
ital market. Fourth, litigation cost hypothesis states that litigation threat from investors due to
inadequate and untimely disclosure may induce managers to disclose and not disclose as inac-
curate disclosuremay increase litigation risks. Fifth, proprietary cost hypothesis, managers may
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not disclose certain information which could harms their product competitiveness. Six, man-
agement talent signaling theory argues that talented managers will make voluntarily disclosure
to reveal their types.
Ownership Concentration
Ownership and control cannot be completely separated within a firm, as owners have a control
right and the controllers frequently have equity ownerships. Therefore, ownership structure
is a part of the important elements of corporate governance. The traditional agency conflict
between owners and controllers (managers) has given rise to the proposition for greater over-
lap between ownership and control. Managerial ownership is perceived to reduce conflict of
interest between controllers and owners, and thus, to increase firm value (Denis & McConnell
2003). Several studies found that various ways have been carried out by controlling shareholders
to extract private purpose, so corporate governance practices tend to be frail due to superfluous
monitoring on management (Johnson et al. 2000; Bertand et al. 2002; Darmadi and Sodikin,
2013).
However, the concentration of ownership is not an effective mechanism to reduce agency
problems in certain environment. Yunos (2011) states that managerial ownership would not
reduce conflict of interest in countries where ownership structure is highly concentrated such
as in East Asian countries. In such countries, the controlling owners have access to private infor-
mation andmight take advantage of it by jeopardizing the interests of theminority shareholders.
A high concentration of ownership would cause a conflict interest between large sharehold-
ers and minority shareholders, leading to low financial performance (Yunos, 2011). Thomsen,
Pedersen and Kvist (2006) had a similar argument by providing evidence in Continental Euro-
pean countries where minority shareholder protection is low. High block-holder ownership
was reported as related to lower firm value and accounting profitability. This finding did not
conclude that ownership concentration had no contribution to firm value; nevertheless if the
level of block-holder ownership is considered too high by minority shareholders, it would have
a negative effect on the following year of financial performance (Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvist
2006). If block holders did not improve firm value, then dispersed ownership should be more
advantage for sharing risk, from Darwinist perspective (Edmans, 2014). Edmans and Manso
(2011) found block holders dispersion is desired (up to point) in situations where ”exit” is an
effective governance mechanism.
Economic Consequence Of Voluntarily Disclosure
Public disclosure may facilitate the reduction of information asymmetries for investor (Kim
and Verrechia, 1994). If all investor well informed, then investors are confident that stock prices
which occur during an announcement date are fairly valued. As a consequence, extended infor-
mation may result in more stock liquidity. Research has documented the economic conse-
quences of high voluntarily disclosure in many countries. Healy, Hutton and Palepu (1999)
found that an increase of disclosure rating of 97 U.S firms is followed by the increase of stock
return, institutional ownership and stock liquidity.This research indicates that extended disclo-
sure attracts institutional investors and analysts, as well as increases the confidence of investors.
A positive relationship between increased disclosure and a firm’s growth and size was also iden-
tified by some research. Iatridis (2006) reports higher size, growth and leverage of high quality
disclosure of UK’s firms. Firms tend to disclose more sensitive accounting issues to convince
investors of the credibility of their accounting policies. However, Yang (2012) argues that stock
reaction of extended disclosure will depend on the credibility of such disclosure. Stock reaction
of management forecast disclosure is reported higher if historical forecast disclosures of man-
agers show higher accuracy (Yang 2012). Uninformed investors maymanipulate the stock price
downward by short-selling, such sales will reduce the stock price and make the manager into
thinking that his investment opportunities are poor and causing him to disinvest incorrectly.
This position can make benefits for “short investors” from this incorrect action (Goldstein and
Guembel, 2008; Khanna & Mathews, 2012).
As research focuses on theUS setting, Bailey, Karolyi and Salva (2006) observe the economic
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consequences of extended disclosure of non-US firms which are listed in the US capital market
has been deserved. It is assumed that the US capital market has better disclosure regulations
compared to non-US countries. Surprisingly, they find that firms which are listed in the US
capital market experience larger abnormal return and volume trading in home capital markets.
Furthermore, the high quality disclosure of 387 non-US firms leads to larger abnormal return
and volume trading compared to those of US firms. However, the level of voluntarily disclosure
of sampleswas notmeasured, as well as the comparation of the economic consequences between
samples and other firms in home countries which results in limited knowledge about economic
consequences of high disclosure firms in home countries. Mitton (2002) provides evidence with
regard to the relationship between the disclosure quality and performance during a crisis period.
Firms in five Asian countries which had better disclosure and lower ownership concentration
showed better performance during the 1997-1998 crises (Mitton 2002).There is evidence about
a significant positive relation between voluntary disclosure and a firm’s financial performance
measured by return on equity in Chinese stock market (Fan, 2006; Wang et al, 2008). Boyson
andMooradian (2011) show that hedge fund activism (shareholders activism) is associatedwith
gains in long term operating performance and short term stock performance. 13D filing (form
that must be filled with US SEC when a person or group acquires more than 5% of firm shares)
by hedge fund activist lead to larger even study returns and improvement in return on asset
(ROA), implying an additional return to activism over stock picking (Edmans, 2014). Bourveau
and Schoenfeld (2017) found that when the threat of activism increases, managers respond by
increasing disclosure (voluntary disclosure).
In Indonesia, where the institutional environment relatively still weak and the history of
the stock market and lack of financial intermediaries, it is predicted that firms with high dis-
closure quality (financial performance information) more attract investors to make investment
decision. As such the first hypothesis of this paper is formulated as:
H-1: there is a positive correlation between voluntarily disclosure quality and stock return,
as well as return on assets
Determinants of Voluntarily Disclosure
Ownership structures and corporate governance are hypothesized to influence a company’s pol-
icy in regard to disclosure as these factors help reduce agency problems. Previous research sug-
gests the relationship between ownership structure and disclosure that Institutional ownership
is reported as a determinant of voluntarily disclosure (Kim andVerrechia 1994; Rouf andHarun
2011). Darmadi and Sodikin (2013) provide evidence about the relationship between institu-
tional ownership and disclosure in Indonesia.They propose an argument that institutional own-
ership reduces information asymmetry, especially in firms where family ownership is prevalent.
This argument is based on Claessen and Fan (2002) who argue that institutional ownership
might improve corporate governance practices in East Asian countries in which ownership is
concentrated in few investors or family members. Khanna & Mathews (2012) show that block
holders with a sufficient stake will have an incentive to buy and to counteract speculators. Inter-
estingly, an increase of the block holder’s private informationmay weaken governance, as it may
encourage to trade on information to maximize trading profits, rather than counteract specu-
lators.
However, the research on the relationship between ownership concentration and voluntar-
ily disclosure is limited and provides inconsistent results (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta
2010).High ownership concentration firms tend to have low voluntarily disclosurewas found by
Legenzova (2008). The same evidence is also provided by Chau and Gray (2002). While Bram-
mer and Pavelin (2006) support a positive relationship.This study argues that as the Indonesian
regulation still has a lower protection on minority shareholders, ownership concentration is
used by investors to control managers. As dominant shareholders have a direct access to private
information, firms tend to convey less information. Pagano and Roell (1998) found manager
ownership chooses shareholder structure when going public. Manager wishes to maximize the
sum of firm value and his private benefits for example the net of monitoring costs borne by the
new block holders (as manager will demand a price discount to offset these costs).
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In Indonesia, the government still takes amajor role in business.Many Indonesia large com-
panies are owned by the government. These state-owned companies are assumed to provide
more information to public, as they will more control from the public. Unlike westernized cor-
porate governance in other business forms, state-owned firms still operate in highly respect to
corporate governance and management control (World Bank, 1995). Hence, government own-
ership has a greater incentives to disclose additional voluntary information to facilitate investor
interest regarding firm value andmanagement quality, the potential for asset misappropriation,
and the government role as a major shareholders. A study in China, stated that an additional
disclosure by government ownership probably less costly since most of firms are operate in
industries deemed by the Chinese government to be of strategic importance and are protected
from international competition (Wang et al, 2008). Ferguson et al (2002) found that state-owned
firms disclosed significantly more strategic and financial information. In the annual reports of
Chinese listed firms, Wang et al (2008) found the level of voluntary disclosure has a positive
relation with the proportion of state ownership. Xiao et al (2004) state that firms with higher
state ownership reduce their website information disclosure to the public.This result is a reflec-
tion of the current lack of attention on profitability and efficiency by government shareholders
or the government direct access to firm insider information.The previous study shown that the
association between voluntary disclosure and government ownership still indeterminable.With
the character of the firms in Indonesia mentioned earlier, the hypothesis in this study leads to a
positive relationshipmore dominant.Therefore hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 of this study are proposed
as:
H-2: Ownership concentration has a negative relationship with the degree of voluntarily
disclosure
H-3: Managerial ownership has a positive relationship with the degree of voluntarily dis-
closure
H-4: Government ownership has a positive relationship with the degree of voluntarily dis-
closure
Literature on corporate governance states that corporate governancemechanismsmay influ-
ence the degree of disclosure, especially the board of director composition. Firms can employ
internal and external corporate governance mechanism which expected to mitigate agency
issues and information asymmetry. Role of board independence represent one of the most
important mechanism of corporate governance (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003; Sharma, 2004;
Ajinkya et al, 2005). Outside directors who are independent from managers are assumed to
encourage firms to disclose more information in order to reduce asymmetric information
(Karagul and Yonet, 2009). Boards with higher proportion of outside directors are able to better
monitor and control the opportunistic behavior of management (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Rindova 1999). Chen and Janggi (2000) found a positive relationship between information dis-
closure and the proportion of independent directors. Independent directors have a significant
role in promoting greater transparency in such firms.
Additionally, Karagul and Yonet (2009) provide evidence about the relationship between
disclosure quality and board size, as larger board size reflects more monitoring which results
in a higher transparency. Samaha, Khlif and Hussainey (2015) who examined the differences
of disclosure index, the type of voluntary disclosure, the method of disclosure, the definitions
of variables relating to corporate governance, the level of investor protection, and country geo-
graphic location, found that board size, board composition have a significant positive effect on
voluntary disclosure.
As directors have amonitoring role, expertise in finance and accounting is essential for them
in doingmonitoring duties. Lanfronconi and Robertson (2002) argue that the collapse of Enron
and WorldCom was perceived to be caused by the deficiency of financial knowledge of board
members. Kesner and Johnson (1990) argue independent board members could give manage-
ment with a better advice with their experiences, expertise and network. Therefore hypothesis
5, 6, and 7 of this study are proposed as:
H-5: Independent director has a positive relationship with the degree of voluntarily disclo-
sure
H-6: Size of director has a positive relationship with the degree of voluntarily disclosure
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H-7: Financial expertise of board members has a positive relationship with the degree of
voluntarily disclosure.
RESEARCH METHOD
There are 130 firms selected as sample data for the two years period. Hence the number of
observations is 260. In selecting the sample data, this study uses a purposive sampling method.
The criteria used in selecting the sample are:
1. It should be listed on the Indonesian Capital Market in period of 2010-2011
2. It should report a positive earning
3. It should have annual reports available in the Indonesian Capital Market website
4. It should have a financial report ended on 31 December
The variables are measured as follows:
1. Voluntarily disclosure (DI) ismeasured using index which contains 76 items. Index is formu-
lated using content analysis of the annual report. Any available item will be scored 1, while
unavailable items will be scored 0.The items of voluntarily disclosure are based in the decree
of the Indonesian Capital Market Oversight Body no. KEP-134/BL/2006.
2. Stock prices return (SPC) is calculated using the share returns around the announcement
dates of the annual report. The study observes the increase/decrease of stock prices 5 days
before the announcement and 5 days after the announcement of the annual report date.
3. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated as
4. Leverage (LEV) is measured as
5. Ownership concentration (BHOWN) is measured by the percentage of ownership held by
block-holders.
6. Managerial ownership (MOWN) is measured by the percentage of ownership held by man-
agement
7. Government ownership (GOWN) is calculated using the percentage of government owner-
ship
8. Independent director (ID) is measured by the ratio of independent director to total number
of director
9. Size of director (SZB) is the log of total number of directors
10. Financial experience of board (BEXP) members is measured using the percentage of board
members who have financial experience or education to the total number of board members
11. Size of firm is measured as the log of total assets
The multivariate model is formulated as:
DI = _1 BHOWN + _2 MOWN + _3 GOWN + _4 ID + _5 SZB +
_6 BEXP + _7 SZF + _8 LEV + e
The variables of leverage and size of firms are included as control variables.
The univariate test is conducted using a Pearson correlationmodel to observe the economic
consequences of extended disclosure.
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The descriptive statistics results are presented in table 1 below.
TABLE 1 jDescriptive Statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
DI 260 0.32 0.87 0.64 0.09
BHOWN 260 0 0.98 0.33 0.3
MOWN 260 0 0.44 0.02 0.07
GOWN 260 0 0.9 0.05 0.17
Continued on next page
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Table 1 continued
ID 260 0 0.8 0.38 0.15
SZB 260 2 10 3.82 1.27
BEXP 260 0 1 0.43 0.77
LEV 260 0.01 3.21 0.52 0.39
ROA 260 0 0.89 0.08 0.1
SPC 260 -9300 4630 -17.26 711.93
SZF 260 8.2 15.18 12.25 0.86
From table, some important findings can be concluded[B1] : (1) the sample firms relatively
have good quality[B2] of disclosure shown by the average of disclosure index being 0.636; (2)
management and government are not dominant shareholders[B3] , as on average they only take
2.6% and 4.8% of total ownership; (3) the board members who have financial experience or
education are relatively dominant which on average 40% of the boardmembers having financial
background or expertise; (4) the number of independent directors takes a portion of almost
40% of total number of director; while on average the size of the board is 4 while the maximum
number ofmembers is 10; (5) during the observation period around the announcement date, on
average the sample firms experienced negative returns as shown by the change of share return
after 5 days after the announcement date compared to 17.26, during the five days before the
announcement date.
Economic Consequences Test results
Univariate test using Pearson correlation model is employed to observe the economic con-
sequences of voluntarily disclosure. From the results of the Pearson correlation model, it can be
seen that the disclosure quality has no relationship with neither ROA nor share returns (SPC).
The p-value of the correlation between ROA andDI is 0.247; while the p-value of the correlation
between DI and the change of share return during the announcement date is 0.096. Hence, it
can be concluded that the hypothesis 1 is rejected which indicates that in Indonesia setting, vol-
untarily disclosure has no a positive economic consequences for firms.The Pearson correlations
results are presented in table 2.
TABLE 2 jCorrelation Coefficients of DI, ROA and SPC
DI ROA SPC
DI
Pearson Correlation 1 .072 .008
Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .904
260 260 260
ROA
Pearson Correlation .072 1 -.021
Sig. (2-tailed) .247 .733
260 260 260
SPC
Pearson Correlation .008 -.021 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .904 .733
260 260 260
The study investigates further regarding the relationship between performance measures
and disclosure quality. The change of disclosure quality or index (DIC) is calculated to know
whether the quality of disclosure has changed during the observation period and whether the
increase or decrease of disclosure quality has a relationship with the share returns (SPC) and
the change of ROA (ROACHG). The results of further investigation are presented in table 3.
From table 3, it can be seen that the increase of disclosure quality has a positive relation-
ship with the increase of share returns and ROA. These results indicate that the improvement
of disclosure quality has economic consequences which result in improvement on share return
and ROA. This result is consistent with the research conducted by Bailey, Karolyi and Salva
(2006) who provide the evidence of share return consequences of higher disclosure. Therefore,
the improvement of disclosure is able to impress investors. These findings are interesting as in
the correlation test it is found that voluntarily disclosure has no relationshipwith ROAnor stock
returns which indicate that voluntarily disclosure has no positive economic consequences for
firms. However, the positive change or improvement of voluntarily disclosure is found to have a
positive economic consequences for firms.These two findings cannot be considered to be a con-
tradiction. There are two factors which may explain these results. First, from signaling theory
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TABLE 3 jCorrelation Coefficients of SPC, DIC and ROACHG
SPC DIC ROACHG
SPC
Pearson Correlation 1 .122* .084
Sig. (2-tailed) .049 .176
260 260 260
DIC
Pearson Correlation .122* 1 .325**
Sig. (2-tailed) .049 ,000
260 260 260
ROACHG
Pearson Correlation .084 .325** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .176 .000
260 260 260
*. Correlation is sig-
nificant at the 0.05
level (2-tailed).
**. Correlation is sig-
nificant at the 0.01
level (2-tailed).
it can be assumed that firms with higher financial performance measured by ROA may convey
more information to investors as they expect that investors will consider the improved financial
performance is the result of good management practices and consequently the management
also expect that the stock prices will soar. The test results also confirm this explanation as the
stock returns of improved voluntarily disclosure firm increase. Second, investors are impressed
with the improvement of quality of disclosure indicated by better voluntarily disclosure which
may cause a positive impact on stock return.
Determinants Test Results
Multivariate test is employed to investigate the determinants of voluntary disclosure.The study
investigates whether ownership and director characteristics induce firms to extend their disclo-
sure.Three (3) ownership variables are tested to have relationships with voluntarily or extended
disclosure quality.Three characteristics of the board are hypothesized to have positive relation-
ships with disclosure quality which are ratio of independent director, size of board and financial
expertise/education background of board. The multivariate test is conducted using the multi-
variate regression model. The results of the multivariate model are presented in table 4.
TABLE 4 jRegression Coefficients
Variables Standardized Coefficients t-value p-value
MOWN
BHOWN
GOWN
ID
SZB
BEXP
LEV
SZF
0.067
-0.032
0.151
-0.059
0.201
-0.090
-0.155
0.020
1.089
-0.501
2.371
-0.941
3.111
-1.515
-2.601
0.306
0.277
0.617
0.019*
0.348
0.002**
0.131
0.010*
0.760
* Significant at the 0.05 level
**Significant at the 0.01 level
From table 4 it can be seen that the hypothesis 2 is rejected as the p-value of BHOWN is
0.617 which indicates that there is no relation between voluntarily disclosure and block-holder
ownership.This result is not consistent with the result of Legenzova (2008) and Chau and Gray
(2002) who found a negative relationship between ownership concentration and quality of dis-
closure. However, this result is consistent with the finding of Eng and Mak (2003) who did
not find a relationship between disclosure and block-holder ownership. In Indonesia the block-
holders are dominantly occupied by families and large institutions which have a direct access
to private information. Thus it seems they have a lack of interest to increase disclosure as they
are able to access information more. Higher ownership concentration seems to be an irrele-
vant variable in influencing quality of disclosure However, such situation is not suitable for the
minority protection.
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The p-value of MOWN is 0.277 which shows that the hypothesis 3 is rejected. The p-value
more than 0.05 indicates that managerial ownership does not affect the quality of disclosure
reflected by voluntarily disclosure. This finding contradicts the hypothesis mentioning that
managerial ownership has appositive relationship with voluntarily disclosure degree. As men-
tioned before that managerial ownership is argued to have a role to reduce agency problems, as
managers take dual roles which are owners and agents. Moreover, manager may attract a posi-
tive image from other shareholders by improving disclosure. Unfortunately, such hypothesis is
not supported by the data, as the managerial ownership in Indonesia is very limited. The aver-
age managerial ownership as shown in table 1 is only 2% which consequently manager’s shares
are not sufficient enough to boast voluntarily disclosure.
However it is found that government ownership is one of the determinants of voluntar-
ily disclosure, as the p-value of government ownership variable is 0.019 which means that the
hypothesis 3 is accepted. It indicates that government is effective to force firms to disclose more
information.This result is consistent with the evidence provided by Eng andMak (2003), Wang
et al, 2008), and Ferguson et al (2002). As state-owned firms, the management of firms have
more responsibility to do transparency compared to private firms because the interest parties
of state-owned firms are varies and the monitoring process is not only carried out by the formal
monitoring bodies such as board of commissioners but also the monitoring will include pub-
lic organization and society. Hence, such tight monitoring will induce firms to do voluntarily
disclosure.
From table 4 it can be seen that from 3 hypotheses involve board composition and char-
acteristics only size of board are found to affect positively on voluntarily disclosure. The p-
value of size of board is 0.02; while the p-value of independent board and financial experi-
ence/background of board are 0.348 and 0.131 respectively. It seems that the individual char-
acteristic of board members may not have a significant power to force firms to disclose more
information, while the board as a group significantly influences firms to have a high degree
of disclosure. Boards with larger memberships may have more power to control which results
in higher disclosure enforcement. Of the control variables, lower leverage is related to higher
extended disclosure. Again this finding is consistentwith the evidence provided by Eng andMak
(2003).This paper’s findings provide consistent evidence about the characteristics of extended
disclosure and governance in emerging countries.
CONCLUSION
Although the concentrated ownership environment is assumed to result in lower disclosure, the
disclosure quality still has positive economic consequences.The study has found that the disclo-
sure improvement is related to the increase of share return and return on assets. The improve-
ment of disclosure could be seen as a positive indicator of better transparency. The improved
financial performance may also induce firms to disclose more information. Larger size of board
and government ownership is related to higher extended disclosure. Block-holder andmanage-
ment ownership are found to be irrelevant in inducing disclosure quality.The individual charac-
teristics of boardmembersmeasured by independence and financial expertise do not determine
the quality of disclosure. This study has contributed to the extension of the knowledge about
the economic consequences of disclosure quality and the factors influencing disclosure quality
in a highly concentrated ownership environment.
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